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THE SOCIAL COSTS OF CHOICE, FREE MARKET
IDEOLOGY AND THE EMPIRICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE
401(K) PLAN LARGE MENU DEFENSE
MERCER BULLARD*
***
This article explores the recent “hidden-fee” litigation trend that has
consumed the 401(k) world and how recent decisions by these courts will
likely result in reduced wealth for workers. The author challenges the
“large menu defense” espoused by the Third, Seventh and Eight Circuit
Courts of Appeals as not fitting within the intent of ERISA’s “safe harbor.”
In addition, the author questions the logic of these decisions by suggesting
that courts are evaluating the employers’ legal responsibilities using freemarket ideology rather than the fiduciary duties prescribed by ERISA and
questions the belief that “large menu” pension benefit plans are wealthmaximizing.
***
In October 2008, just after the peak of the financial crisis, former
Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Alan Greenspan, testified: “I do have an
ideology. My judgment is that free, competitive markets are by far the
unrivaled way to organize economies. We’ve tried regulation. None
meaningfully worked.”1 In fact, regulation has often worked and worked
well, as illustrated by reforms in pension plan regulation. Investors often
do behave like the rational actors on which the efficacy of free, competitive
markets is based, especially when they are deciding whether to participate
in their employers’ 401(k) plans. Many employees do not participate, even
when their employers offer to match employees’ contributions. In 2006,
Congress amended the Employee Retirement Security Income Act of 1974
(ERISA) to permit employers to automatically enroll their employees in the
company’s 401(k) plan. As a result, plan participation rates have risen
*

Associate Professor of Law at the University of Mississippi School of Law
and Mississippi Defense Lawyers Association Distinguished Lecturer.
1
Financial Crisis and the Role of Government Regulators: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 46 (2008). As the financial
crisis unfolded around him, however, Chairman Greenspan acknowledged that he
had become aware of a “flaw” in this ideology. Id.
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dramatically. This regulatory “nudge” has increased the wealth of millions
of Americans.
In a series of recent decisions, however, federal courts have taken
positions that effectively reduce employee participation rates in 401(k)
plans. They have exalted free market ideology in derogation of express
regulatory mandates on the assumption that substituting their economic
assumptions for legal requirements will maximize the wealth of 401(k)
participants. Yet their faith in free markets is not grounded in any
empirical foundation. In fact, their economic theories are directly
contradicted by the overwhelming weight of empirical research, which
shows that the effect of their decisions will reduce workers’ wealth rather
than increase it. This collision of judicial free-market ideology and
financial reality, the subject of this article, is costing American workers
billions of dollars in lost pension benefits every year.
Over the last decade, a slew of lawsuits have consumed the 401(k)
world, making a substantial amount of new case law and sending
employers in search of experts to find ways to protect them from liability.
This so-called “hidden-fee litigation” generally involves claims that
employers and other pension benefit plan fiduciaries violated ERISA’s
“prudent man” rule by selecting investment options that charge excessive
fees and hide information about fees from participants. Some courts have
dismissed claims against employers that offer a large number of investment
options in their plans on the ground that, regardless of whether the
employer acted imprudently, the legal cause of any resulting loss was the
participant’s choice of the option(s) in which to invest. These courts
consider large 401(k) menus to offer a kind of marketplace that trumps
employers’ fiduciary obligations. This “large menu defense” creates an
incentive for employers to increase the number of options in their 401(k)
plans in order to minimize their ERISA liability risk.
These courts have ignored ERISA’s express imposition of liability
on plan fiduciaries for failing to exercise due care in choosing plan
investment options. Section 404(a) of the Act establishes a “prudent man”
standard that requires, among other things, that plan sponsors choose
investment options with due care. Section 404(c) provides a safe harbor
(“404(c)” or “control” safe harbor) from Section 404(a) liability to the
extent that a self-directed plan permits a participant “to exercise control
over the assets in his account.” Under Section 404(c)’s authority, the
Department of Labor (DOL) has adopted rules providing that a participant
may be deemed to have exercised control if, among other things, the plan
offers a “broad range of investment alternatives” that enables participants
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to create portfolios with risk-return characteristics that are appropriate for
the participant.
Some courts have deemed participants to have exercised control
under the 404(c) safe harbor if a plan’s range of options is so broad that, in
the court’s opinion, it approximates the range of options that would be
available in a free market. 2 The availability of a large range of options
thereby abrogates employer responsibility for imprudently selecting
investment options. The large menu defense effectively substitutes judicial
economic theories for statutory fiduciary duties, based primarily on the
courts’ ideological view, like Chairman Greenspan’s, that participants’
choices should be regulated by free market principles rather than under
ERISA’s fiduciary duties. The courts’ view, consistent with widely
accepted rational choice theory, is that offering the largest range of choices
will maximize workers’ wealth. Indeed, they view increasing choice, in
and of itself, as a central purpose of ERISA.
This de facto judicial nullification of ERISA’s prudent man rule
would not be of such concern if the courts were correct that larger menus
create wealth for workers. In that case, employers that increased the
number of options in their plans in order to reduce their ERISA liability
risk would also maximize the social benefits of 401(k) plans. However,
empirical research shows that larger menus are inversely correlated with
workers’ wealth. Large 401(k) menus result in lower participation rates,
overly conservative allocations, inferior investment options and other
adverse effects that, collectively, cost workers billions of dollars every
year. Notwithstanding the courts’ views on rational choice theory, “a fully
informed and fully rational investor would prefer a smaller menu.”3
Section I of this article describes the legal framework for employers’
liability under ERISA in connection with the selection of plan investment
options. Section II discusses the large menu defense adopted by courts that
have dismissed fiduciary claims against employers that were alleged to
have selected options impudently. The courts’ free-market rationale for the
large menu defense is described in Section III, and Section IV sets forth the
empirical research on the wealth-reducing effects of large menus in 401(k)
plans. Section V concludes.
2

See infra Section II.
David Goldreich & Hanna Hałaburda, When Smaller Menus Are Better:
Variability in Menu-Setting Ability 4 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 11086, 2011), available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/11-086.
pdf.
3
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BACKGROUND

ERISA generally applies to “employee benefit plans,” which are
defined to include employee welfare benefit plans and employee pension
benefit plans.4 This article is concerned with pension benefit plans, such as
401(k) plans, which are defined as funds or programs maintained by an
employer that “(i) provide retirement income to employees, or (ii) result in
a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination
of covered employment or beyond.” 5 If an employer offers a pension
benefit plan, ERISA requires that it identify at least one “named” fiduciary
who is responsible for the administration of the plan. For example, the plan
trustee is a named plan fiduciary. A person can also become a fiduciary by
exercising discretion over plan assets or providing advice for a fee to the
plan. A plan fiduciary can designate another person as a fiduciary and
thereby shift their fiduciary responsibilities to that person.
A plan fiduciary is subject to two primary sets of duties under
ERISA. First, Section 404(a) of ERISA subjects fiduciaries to a prudent
man standard of care. They must act with the “care, skill, prudence, and
diligence” that a “prudent man acting in a like capacity” would use in
selecting investment options and diversifying the plan’s investments “so as
to minimize the risk of large losses.” Section 404(a) also imposes a duty of
loyalty. Fiduciaries must discharge their duties “solely in the interests of
the participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of: (i)
providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying
reasonable expenses of administering the plan.”
Second, ERISA prohibits plan fiduciaries from engaging in a broad
range of transactions with the plan. Specifically, Section 406(b) of ERISA
prohibits fiduciaries from dealing with plan assets in the fiduciary’s “own
interest,” acting on behalf of an adverse party in a transaction, or receiving
any consideration from any party dealing with the plan in connection with a
transaction involving the assets of the plan. Plan participants have a private
right of action against fiduciaries to recover losses resulting from a breach
of their obligations under ERISA. 6 The breadth of Sections 404(a) and
406(b), coupled with a private right of action for damages, presents
employers with significant liability risk.
4

29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2006).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2006).
6
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006).
5
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To mitigate this risk, ERISA provides a number of statutory safe
harbors for fiduciaries, which are supplemented by prohibited transaction
exemptions and interpretive safe harbors promulgated by the DOL.7 Plan
fiduciaries generally attempt to limit their liability by conforming their
conduct to these safe harbors and exemptions. One of the most commonly
relied-upon safe harbors is provided by Section 404(c)(1)(A)(ii) (“404(c)”
or “control” safe harbor), which insulates fiduciaries from liability for
losses resulting “from the participant’s or beneficiary’s exercise of control”
over the assets in his account.
The DOL has set forth a number of conditions on the availability of
the 404(c) safe harbor. These conditions include offering a diversified set
of investment options and providing participants with sufficient
information to evaluate them. A participant has “exercised control” if,
among other things, he “has an opportunity to choose, from a broad range
of investment alternatives, the manner in which some or all of the assets in
his account are invested.”8 A “broad range of investment alternatives” has
been provided if the participant has an opportunity to: (1) materially affect
the potential return and degree of risk of the account; (2) diversify so as to
minimize the risk of large losses; and (3) choose from at least three
diversified investment options. 9 These investment options must have
materially different risk and return characteristics such that they can be
combined in a portfolio with aggregate risk-return characteristics that are

7

See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(19) (2006) (exemption from Section 406(b)(2)
for certain cross transactions); Class Exemption To Permit Certain Loans of
Securities by Employee Benefit Plans, 71 Fed. Reg. 63,786 (Feb. 2, 2006)
(exemption from Section 406(b)(1) with respect to securities lending activities);
Class Exemption for Cross-Trades of Securities by Index and Model-Driven
Funds, 67 Fed. Reg. 6614 (Feb. 12, 2002) (exemption from 406(b)(2) with respect
to certain cross transactions involving passively managed funds); Class Exemption
for Securities Transactions Involving Employee Benefit Plans and Broker-Dealers,
51 Fed. Reg. 41,686 (Nov. 18, 1986) (exemption from Section 406(b) to
fiduciaries that execute transactions on behalf of a plan); Class Exemption for
Certain Transactions Between Investment Companies and Employee Benefit Plans,
42 Fed. Reg. 18,732 (Apr. 8, 1977) (exemption for fiduciary when acting in
capacity of investment adviser to mutual fund in which plan assets are invested);
see also 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e) (2012) (no breach of fiduciary duty solely by reason
of receiving soft dollar benefits limited to brokerage and research services).
8
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c–1(b)(1)(ii) (2013).
9
29 C.F.R. §2550.404c-1(b)(iii) (2013).
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within the range that is appropriate for the participant and that tend to
minimize the risk of the overall portfolio.
Over the last decade, a series of lawsuits against plan fiduciaries has
challenged the edifice of safe harbors and exemptions on which they have
come to depend. The plaintiffs in these lawsuits – lawsuits which are often
referred to as “hidden fee litigation” – have generally claimed that plan
fiduciaries violated their duties by offering investment options that charge
excessive and/or hidden fees. Plaintiffs allege that fees were hidden
because they were not disclosed to participants and excessive because the
plans invested in retail classes of fund shares that made side payments to
plan services providers (known as “revenue sharing” payments) rather than
in less expensive institutional classes of shares. The hidden fee litigation
has generated dozens of judicial decisions addressing a broad array of
issues under ERISA.
This article focuses on the role that the size of a plan’s menu of
investment options has played in the application of the 404(c) safe harbor
and the disposition of these cases. As discussed immediately below, a
number of courts have found that offering a large menu of investment
options supports a finding that participants exercised control for purposes
of the safe harbor. These courts have expressly rejected the DOL’s
“paternalistic” view that plan fiduciaries are responsible for any options
that have been imprudently included in the mix even when participants
have been able to choose from a large number of alternatives.
II.

THE LARGE MENU DEFENSE

In one set of hidden fee cases, courts have held that offering a large
number of investment options can protect an ERISA fiduciary from
liability, while offering a small number may increase a fiduciary’s legal
exposure. The leading case for the “large menu defense” is Hecker v.
Deere & Co., in which the Seventh Circuit found that Deere’s offering of
thousands of investment options in its 401(k) helped establish that, even if
some options had been imprudently selected, Deere’s imprudence could not
have been a legal cause of the plaintiffs’ losses.10 The court found that the
large menu of investment options effectively placed the participant in
control of his investment decisions, thereby relieving Deere of potential
liability.

10

Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 584–87 (7th Cir. 2009).
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In Hecker, a class of participants in Deere’s 401(k) plan sued Deere
for breaching its fiduciary duty to the plan by, among other things,
selecting investment options that charged excessive, hidden fees. The
plaintiffs generally alleged that the fees were excessive because: (1) the
administrator of the plan was compensated indirectly through revenue
sharing payments by the investment options in which the plans invested
rather than directly from the plans themselves; and (2) those fees were not
reasonable in view of the services provided. They argued that Deere
violated its fiduciary duty by failing to exercise proper care in evaluating
and selecting the investment options.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the
ground that Deere was protected by ERISA’s 404(c) safe harbor. As noted
above, the 404(c) safe harbor insulates fiduciaries from liability for any
loss that “results from the participant’s or beneficiary’s exercise of control”
over the assets in his account. The court found that Deere had satisfied the
404(c) safe harbor by offering a large number of investment options.11 The
plan offered twenty-three Fidelity mutual funds, two funds managed by
Fidelity Trust, an employer stock fund, and an investment window that
provided access to more than 2,500 funds managed by different
companies.12 The district court found that, in light of the large number of
investment options and the impossibility of every one of them having an
excessive expense ratio, “[t]he only possible conclusion is that to the extent
participants incurred excessive expenses, those losses were the result of
participants exercising control over their investments within the meaning of
the safe harbor provision.”13 Whether Deere exercised due care in selecting
the investment options did not matter to the court: “[a]ssuming . . . that
defendants failed to satisfy their fiduciary obligation to consider expenses
when selecting mutual fund investment options, they are nevertheless
insulated from liability by the safe harbor provision because of the nature
and breadth of funds made available to participants under the plans.”14
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed that Deere had “include[d] a
sufficient range of options so that the participants have control over the risk

11

Although the 404(c) safe harbor is an affirmative defense that normally
would not be available at the pleading stage, the court found that the plaintiffs had
opened the door to defense by anticipating the safe harbor in their complaint.
12
556 F.3d at 578.
13
Hecker v. Deere & Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d 967, 976 (W.D. Wis. 2007).
14
Id. at 976.
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of loss.”15 Assuming that Deere had a duty to “furnish an acceptable array
of investment vehicles,” the court found that the “wide range of expense
ratios among the 20 Fidelity mutual funds and the 2,500 other funds
available through [the plan]” satisfied this duty.16 Any losses experienced
by participants were “attributable to their individual choices. Given the
numerous investment options, varied in type and fee, neither Deere nor
Fidelity . . . can be held responsible for those choices.”17
The Third Circuit adopted Hecker’s large menu defense in Renfro v.
Unisys Corp.18 In Renfro, a class of participants in Unisys Corporation’s
401(k) plan sued Unisys for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA. As in
Hecker, the plaintiffs claimed that defendants’ selection of investment
options was imprudent because the options charged revenue sharing
payments that were hidden and excessive. The plan, one of the largest one
percent of 401(k) plans in the U.S., held approximately $2 billion in more
than seventy different investment options. Nearly $1.9 billion of that
amount was held in “Fidelity-branded” retail mutual funds that plaintiffs
alleged had charged excessive fees.
The district court granted Unisys’s motion to dismiss on the ground
that “no rational trier of fact could find, on the basis of the facts alleged in
the operative complaint, that the Unisys Defendants breached an ERISA
fiduciary duty by offering this particular array of investment vehicles.”19
The court, citing Hecker in support, found that Unisys could not be held
liable for the selection of investments because it had offered a broad range
of investment alternatives, regardless of whether it had placed any
inappropriate investment options in the plan. 20 The participants “could
choose from among the investment options to create a portfolio tailored to
meet their investment objectives,”21 which insulated Unisys from liability.
The court considered Unisys’s large menu to support both a Rule 12(b)(6)

15

556 F.3d at 589.
Id. at 586.
17
Id. at 590.
18
Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2011).
19
Renfro v. Unisys Corp., No. 07-2098, 2010 WL 1688540, at *5 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 26, 2010).
20
Id. at *9.
21
Id. at *5.
16

2014

THE SOCIAL COSTS OF CHOICE

343

motion to dismiss and a summary judgment motion based on the 404(c)
safe harbor.22
The Third Circuit declined to rule on the safe harbor issue, but
affirmed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the complaint on the basis of the
large menu defense. The court observed that the plan included “seventythree distinct investment options . . . company stock, commingled funds,
and mutual funds . . . [representing] a variety of risk and fee profiles,”23
thereby accomplishing ERISA’s purpose of “offer[ing] participants
meaningful choices about how to invest their retirement savings.” 24
Following Hecker’s lead, the court found that offering a large number of
investment options insulated Unisys from liability as to the particular
options it had selected for the plan.
The district court in Renfro took Hecker one step further by raising
the possibility that, if the number of funds were a factor supporting
liability, liability might arise from the offering of too few investment
options in a plan, not too many. The court observed that, while the plan in
Hecker included more than 2,500 options, “the Hecker court in no way
indicated that fiduciaries to an ERISA plan breach their duty when they
offer less than a few thousand investment options to plan participants.”25 In
fact, a court had already found that offering too few options might increase
a plan sponsor’s liability risk.
In Braden v. Wal-Mart, the Eighth Circuit found that the relatively
small number of investment options in Wal-Mart’s 401(k) provided support
for plaintiffs’ claim that Wal-Mart had managed the plan imprudently.26 As
in Hecker and Renfro, a class of 401(k) participants alleged that the plan’s
fees were excessive and hidden, and that Wal-Mart had failed adequately to
investigate lower-cost alternatives. The Wal-Mart plan offered only “ten
mutual funds, a common/collective trust, Wal-Mart common stock, and a
stable value fund.” The court characterized the plaintiffs as alleging that
the “[p]lan include[d] a relatively limited menu of funds which were
selected by Wal-Mart executives despite the ready availability of better

22

Although the court did not rely on the control safe harbor per se in granting
the motion to dismiss, it effectively adopted the safe harbor’s reasoning. The
following discussion treats this court as having applied the control safe harbor.
23
671 F.3d at 327.
24
Id.
25
Renfro, 2010 WL 1688540, at n.6.
26
Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009).
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options.”27 It specifically compared Wal-Mart’s small menu of options with
the 2,500 mutual funds offered by the plan in Hecker, and quoted the
Hecker court’s finding that it was “untenable to suggest that all of the more
than 2,500 publicly available investment options had excessive expense
ratios.”28 In contrasting the present facts with Hecker, the court concluded
that “[t]he far narrower range of investment options available in this case
makes more plausible the claim that this Plan was imprudently
managed.”29
The Renfro court made the inverse relationship between Hecker’s
large menu defense and Braden’s small menu stigma explicit in describing
the cases as sharing a “similar analytical framework”: “Both courts looked
first to the characteristics of the mix and range of options and then
evaluated the plausibility of claims challenging fund selection against the
backdrop of the reasonableness of the mix and range of investment
options.”30 The court in Renfro viewed small-menu Braden as taking the
same approach as large-menu Hecker in declining to dismiss “in light of a
plan that had far fewer available investment options than the plan in
Hecker.”31
The large menu defense caught the attention of the DOL, which
objected to the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Hecker. In an amicus brief,
the DOL complained that the court’s decision would provide a defense for
a fiduciary’s imprudent selection of investment options if the fiduciary

27

Id. at 596.
Id. at n.6 (quoting Hecker, 556 F.3d at 581).
29
Id. (emphasis added); see Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 796 F. Supp. 2d
959, 963 (S.D. Iowa 2010) (citing argument that limited menu in Braden,
compared with large menu in Hecker, made imprudent management claim more
plausible); Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 711 F.3d 1061, 1083 (9th Cir. 2013) (reiterating
the argument in Ruppert).
30
Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 326 (3d Cir. 2011).
31
Id. at 327. (“We agree with our sister circuits' approach to evaluating these
claims. An ERISA defined contribution plan is designed to offer participants
meaningful choices about how to invest their retirement savings. Accordingly, we
hold the range of investment options and the characteristics of those included
options – including the risk profiles, investment strategies, and associated fees –
are highly relevant and readily ascertainable facts against which the plausibility of
claims challenging the overall composition of a plan's mix and range of investment
options should be measured.”).
28
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simply selected a large number of options. 32 In response, the Seventh
Circuit acknowledged that such a strategy would “result in the inclusion of
many investment alternatives that a responsible fiduciary should exclude
[and] . . . place an unreasonable burden on unsophisticated plan participants
who do not have the resources to pre-screen investment alternatives.” 33
This concession seemed to reflect the court’s reconsideration of the large
menu defense, but the court said nothing about this “burden on
unsophisticated plan participants” lessening their ultimate responsibility for
losses under the safe harbor. Nor did the court disavow the dispositive
weight afforded to the offering of a large number of investment options in
determining whether the participant had exercised control over his account.
The Seventh Circuit soon removed any doubt about its commitment to
the large menu defense. In Loomis v. Exelon Corp.,34 the court relied on
Hecker’s large menu defense to dismiss hidden-excessive fee claims
against Exelon Corp. 35 Its understanding of Hecker and Hecker II was
unambiguous: “By offering a wide range of options, Hecker held, Deere's
plan complied with ERISA's fiduciary duties. Plaintiffs contend that the
32

Amended Brief of the Sec’y of Labor, Elaine Chao, as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Hecker v. Deere & Co., 2008 WL 5731147 (7th
Cir. April 4, 2008) (No. 08-1224).
33
Hecker v. Deere & Co., 569 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2009) [hereinafter
Hecker II]. Phyllis Borzi, the Assistant Secretary for the Employee Benefits
Administration, has cited finding “‘a disturbing trend’ among plan sponsors
seeking to avoid ERISA responsibility by ‘just giving choices’” in reference to
401(k) brokerage account windows. Hazel Bradford, Borzi: Sponsors Have Always
Been Responsible for Monitoring Brokerage Windows, PENSION & INVESTMENTS
(June 18, 2012), http://www.pionline.com/article/20120618/DAILYREG/
120619900/borzi-sponsors-have-always-been-responsible-for-monitoringbrokerage-windows. This statement was made in the context of guidance issued by
the Department of Labor (“DOL”) in May 2012 that took the position that
employers may be responsible for decisions made within a 401(k) brokerage
account window. See Robert Steyer, Labor Department Stands Firm on SelfDirected Brokerage Account Guidance, PENSION & INVESTMENTS (Aug. 6, 2012),
http://www.pionline.com/article/20120601/DAILYREG/120609983/labordepartment-stands-firm-on-self-directed-brokerage-account-guidance. The DOL
later withdrew that position under industry pressure. See Robert Steyer, ‘Intensive’
Lobbying Behind DOL Turnabout on DC Plan Brokerage Window, PENSION &
INVESTMENTS (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.pionline.com/article/20120806/
PRINTSUB/308069984.
34
Loomis v. Exelon Corp., 658 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2011).
35
Id.
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panel in Hecker retreated from this holding when denying a petition for
rehearing [in Hecker II]. It did not.”36
The court characterized Hecker as having “held that as a matter of
law that [Deere offered] an acceptable array of investment options,
observing that ‘all of these funds were also offered to investors in the
general public, and so the expense ratios necessarily were set against the
backdrop of market competition.’”37
The Loomis court applied the Hecker large menu defense in finding
that Exelon could not be faulted if it selected hidden excessive fee options
for the plan because, with thirty-two investment options to choose from,
36

Id. at 670. Notwithstanding the court’s definitive statement that Hecker II
did not represent a change in the court’s position, the DOL has argued that Hecker
II “backed away” from the “breadth of its earlier ruling,” citing the Seventh
Circuit’s subsequent decision in Howell. Howell v. Motorola, Inc., 633 F.3d 552
(7th Cir. 2011). See Brief for the Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 2011 WL 2178417 at *24 (9th Cir.
May 25, 2011) (No. 10-56415) (quoting Howell, 633 F.3d at 567 (citing Hecker,
569 F.3d at 708)). However, Howell involved the prudence of offering an
employer stock option in the plan, and courts have applied a different, arguably
inconsistent standard in cases involving employer stock. Howell, 633 F.3d. at 567.
Howell’s position on the responsibility of employers for imprudently selecting
employer stock as an option directly contradicts the same court’s position on the
selection of other types of options: “The choice of which investments will be
presented in the menu that the plan sponsor adopts is not within the participant's
power. It is instead a core decision relating to the administration of the plan and the
benefits that will be offered to participants. . . . It is . . . the fiduciary's
responsibility . . . to screen investment alternatives and to ensure that imprudent
options are not offered to plan participants. Id. Although beyond the scope of this
article, it is worth noting that courts such as Howell have been more willing to
second-guess employers’ choice of employer stock as an option than diversified
mutual funds notwithstanding that ERISA provides a specific statutory safe harbor
for employer stock. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (2011); see, e.g., Pfeil v. State
Street Bank & Trust Co., 671 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2012); Peabody v. Davis, 636 F.3d
368 (7th Cir. 2011); DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 410 (4th Cir. 2007);
Langbecker v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 476 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 2007); Dann v.
Lincoln Nat’l Corp., 274 F.R.D. 139 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
37
Loomis, 658 F.3d at 670 (quoting Hecker, 556 F.3d at 586). See Spano v.
Boeing, 633 F.3d 574, 586 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Cf. Hecker, 556 F.3d 575, 584–87
(7th Cir. 2009) (noting that the record showed sufficient variety in investments and
fee levels to satisfy ERISA requirements)”); Loomis v. Exelon Corp., No. 06 CV
4900, 2009 WL 4667092 at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2009) (endorsing Hecker’s
“sufficient mix of investments defense”).
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“[a]ny participant who want[ed] a fund with expenses under 0.1% can get it
through Exelon's Plan.”38 The court appeared to believe that the employer
did not have a fiduciary duty to abjure excessive or hidden fee investment
options for its plan because the large number of options offered ensured
that at least one low-cost option was available.
Thus, the Third, Seventh and Eighth Circuits have taken the position
that a large 401(k) menu can protect a plan fiduciary from liability for
imprudently selecting investment options for the plan. Even assuming that
the plan fiduciary violated Section 404(c)’s prudent man standard in the
selection of investment options, the availability of a large number of
options abrogated the fiduciary’s legal responsibility under ERISA.
Conversely, offering a small menu of investment options, as in Wal-Mart,
made it “more plausible” that the plan was imprudently managed. The
large menu defense courts view participants as having exercised safe
harbor control when the number of investment options is large enough that
the participants’ choices become the effective, proximate cause of any
losses resulting from, for example, excessive fees.
Although no other court has directly addressed the large menu
defense, the Ninth Circuit has rejected the mainstay of the large menu
defense theory that employers’ responsibility for imprudently selecting
investment options can be abrogated in the context of a menu of diversified
investment options. In Tibble v. Edison Int’l, the court explained that
treating a participant’s act of choosing an investment option as abrogating
the employer’s responsibility for selecting options could not be reconciled
with the plain meaning of the statute.39 The court found that considering the
participant’s investment decision as an intervening cause of the
participant’s loss, i.e., a safe-harbor exercise of control, “would render
parts of the ERISA statute a nullity by making it nearly impossible for
defined-contribution-plan
beneficiaries
to
vindicate
fiduciary
imprudence.”40 Defendants in ERISA cases would always be able to pass
38

Loomis, 658 F.3d at 671.
Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 711 F.3d 1061, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013). In Tibble, the
court affirmed the district court’s finding that the employer had imprudently failed
to consider the potential cost savings of selecting institutional rather than retail
classes of mutual fund shares. During the relevant period, the plan at issue offered
from six to fifty investment options. See Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 639 F. Supp. 2d
1074, 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2009). Neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit
addressed the issue of the size of the menu.
40
Tibble, 711 F.3d at 1074 (citing LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc.,
552 U.S. 248, 256 (2008) (citing the DOL's regulations implementing section
39
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responsibility for losses to participants because “there can be no loss
without the participant selecting an investment.”41 The Tibble court agreed
with the DOL’s view that the employer’s selection of investment options
necessarily precedes the participant’s investment decision and therefore
should reasonably be viewed as the most salient cause of losses arising
from the inclusion of a particular option in the 401(k) menu.42 As explained
in Tibble, the large menu defense contradicts the plain meaning of the
control safe harbor.
The large menu defense interpretation of the control safe harbor also
fails because it misreads the purpose of the safe harbor’s “broad range of
investment alternatives” requirement. The courts view the broad-range
requirement as reflecting a policy favoring large menus, as if its purpose
were to maximize participant choice. The Renfro court stated that “[a]n
ERISA defined contribution plan is designed to offer participants
meaningful choices,”43 which Loomis echoed in characterizing the 404(c)
safe harbor as “encourag[ing] sponsors to allow more choice to participants
in defined-contribution plans.” 44 The courts interpret the safe harbor’s
diversification requirement as reflecting Congress’s wish that employers
offer as many options as feasible to provide participants with the greatest
possible control over their investments.
This choice-for-choice’s sake view misunderstands that the broadrange requirement is designed to promote diversification, not large menus.
It is intended to incentivize employers to offer menus that enable
participants to construct an efficient portfolio with appropriate risk-return
characteristics. 45 The diversification purpose of the broad-range
404(c) in rejecting the converse interpretation) and Langbecker, 476 F.3d at 321
(Reavley, J., dissenting) (“All commentators recognize that § 404(c) does not shift
liability for a plan fiduciary's duty to ensure that each investment option is and
continues to be a prudent one.”)).
41
Tibble, 711 F.3d at 1073 (“For a 401(k) (or for any defined-contribution
plan for that matter), it is admittedly the case that monetary damage flowing from a
fiduciary's imprudent design of the investment menu passes through the
participant, as intermediary. But is it proper to conclude that those losses, in the
language of section 404(c), ‘result from’ the participant's choice? This might seem
an odd question given that, literally speaking, there can be no loss without the
participant selecting an investment.”).
42
Id.
43
Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 327 (3d Cir. (2011).
44
Loomis v. Exelon Corp., 658 F.3d 667, 673 (7th Cir. 2011).
45
A “broad range of investment alternatives” has been provided if the
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requirement is illustrated by the following example. If a participant who
planned to retire in 2008 had invested 100% of her assets in stock funds
(which would have declined precipitously that year), that unfortunate
allocation decision would have reflected her exercise of control if the
employer had provided a diversified menu of options, including fixed
income options in which she could have invested to create a more
appropriate portfolio.46 The allocation would have been entirely outside the
employer’s control.47 In contrast, if the stock funds that she chose were
participant has an opportunity to: (1) materially affect the potential return and
degree of risk of the account;, (2) diversify to as to minimize the risk of large
losses; and (3) choose from at least three diversified investment options. These
investment options must have materially different risk and return characteristics
such that they can be combined in a portfolio: (1) with aggregate risk-return
characteristics that are within the range that is appropriate for the participant and
(2) that tends to minimize the risk of the overall portfolio. See 29 C.F.R. §
2550.404c–1.
46
As stated by the Seventh Circuit in an employer-stock option case, “it would
make no sense [under the 404(c) safe harbor] to blame the fiduciary for the
participant's decision to invest 40% of her assets in Fund A and 60% in Fund B,
rather than splitting assets somehow among four different funds, emphasizing A
rather than B, or taking any other decision.” Howell v. Motorola, Inc., 633 F.3d
552, 567 (7th Cir. 2011). (As noted earlier, the Seventh Circuit has not applied its
analysis in employer-stock cases to cases involving the selection of other types of
investment options.) The Hecker and Loomis courts effectively held that choosing
an excessive fee option over a non-excessive fee option from a large menu is the
equivalent of choosing Fund A over Fund B, in that the participant’s decision is the
proximate cause of both decisions. But the Hecker and Loomis analysis does not
make sense as an interpretation of the DOL’s “broad range” requirement. That
requirement is designed to produce a menu with diversified risk/return
characteristics; it is not designed to produce a menu that is diversified in the sense
of offering a mix of excessive and non-excessive fee options.
47
Although the participant’s allocation may have been the legal cause of the
losses, research shows that the selection of the menu, even if it is adequately
diversified, also bears a causal relationship to the participant’s allocation. For
example, participants will invest a much higher percentage of plan assets in stock
funds when a plan offers a mix of four stock funds and one bond fund than when
the plan offers a mix of one stock fund and four bond funds. See Shlomo Benartzi
& Richard H. Thaler, Naive Diversification Strategies in Defined Contribution
Saving Plans, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 79, 87 (2001) (finding that when equity options
comprised a larger percentage of hypothetical options, study subjects invested a
larger percentage of accounts in equities than when equity options comprised a
smaller percentage of options), available at http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/
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imprudently selected because they charged excessive fees, then the
employer would be responsible for the losses due to the excessive fees.
Although the employee chose the excessive fee option, and there may have
been stock funds in the menu that did not charge excessive fees, the
employer’s selection of the options would have been the proximate,
preceding cause of the loss. Whether the total number of options was large
or small is irrelevant to the employer’s responsibility for the imprudent
selection of the excessive fee option.
In summary, some courts have dismissed claims that an employer
violated the prudent man standard by placing excessive fee investment
options in its 401(k) plan based on a large menu defense. The courts have
reasoned that when a 401(k) plan offers a large number of investment
options, any losses due to the imprudent selection of an investment option
resulted not from the employer’s selection of the investment option, but
from the participant’s exercise of control in choosing to invest in the
option. This position is inconsistent with ERISA because the preceding
proximate cause of losses due to the inclusion of an imprudently selected
investment in the plan is, in fact, the employer’s decision to include the
investment in the plan. The courts’ large menu defense cannot be
reconciled with a reasonable reading of the control safe harbor. The courts
also seem to misunderstand that the purpose of the safe harbor’s legal
incentives to offer a broad range of investment alternatives is not to inflate
the size of 401(k) menus, but to encourage employers to offer an
appropriately diverse set of options. However, the large menu defense may
reflect less of a disagreement about the nature of causation or the meaning
of the safe harbor than a more fundamental ideological view that the
regulation of plan participants’ 401(k) investments should be left to the
marketplace rather than ERISA’s fiduciary duties.

documents/areas/fac/accounting/naive_diversification.pdf; see also Jeffrey Brown
et al., Individual Account Investment Options and Portfolio Choice: Behavioral
Lessons from 401(K) Plans (NBER Working Paper, No. 13169, June 2007)
(increasing equity fund representation from 1/3 to 1/2 of menu increased
participants’ equity allocations by 7.5%) (“Behavioral Lessons”), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13169.pdf?new_window=1; Anders Karlsson et al.,
Portfolio Choice and Menu Exposure, EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings (February 7,
2006) (likelihood of option being chosen increases with its representation in
menu), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=888661 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.888661.
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FREE MARKETS, LARGE MENUS AND THE FIDUCIARY
STANDARD

The remainder of this article discusses two major concerns
regarding the large menu defense. The first concern is that the large menu
defense evinces a judicial decision to evaluate employers’ legal
responsibilities on the basis of judges’ free market ideology instead of
employers’ fiduciary duties under ERISA. These judges prefer that
economic activities be allowed to operate pursuant to free market axioms,
which conflicts with the imposition of a fiduciary duty on employers. The
large menu defense reflects the particular free market axiom that offering
plan participants the widest possible range of choice in their 401(k) plans
maximizes social wealth. However, this position is fundamentally
incompatible with the mandate in ERISA to enforce the paternalistic
principles that a fiduciary duty inherently entails, as discussed further in
this section. The second concern presented by the large menu defense, as
discussed in Section IV, is that the courts’ view that large 401(k) menus are
wealth-maximizing is empirically false. Large 401(k) menus make
workers poorer, not wealthier.
The large menu defense is generally based on the view that free
market principles are superior to fiduciary duties in regulating employers’
selections of 401(k) investment options. The defense views a large 401(k)
menu as effectively a marketplace in which the only legally controlling
factor is the participant’s role in choosing an investment. Courts in favor
of the large menu defense found that participants were responsible
“because of the nature and breadth of funds made available,” “the
numerous investment options,” and “the wide range of expense ratios
among” the funds offered. The plans offered a “variety of risk and fee
profiles” constituting “meaningful choices about how to invest their
retirement savings” and included enough investment options from which
“to create a portfolio tailored to meet [participants’] investment
objectives.”
A plan that replicates an open marketplace effectively abrogates
the employer’s legal responsibility for selecting investment options for the
plan. In contrast, Wal-Mart’s “narrower range of investment options”
made “it more plausible . . . that the Plan was imprudently managed”
because the invisible hand of the market was replaced with the visible hand
of the employer. Where the number of plans is small, the employer may be
faulted for interfering with free market forces by narrowing participants’
investment decisions to an artificially limited set. If employers allow the
invisible hand free reign, then they will be relieved of liability.
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This ideology is illustrated in Hecker, as quoted approvingly in
Loomis, where the court notes that Deere’s 401(k) funds “were also offered
to investors in the general public, and so the expense ratios necessarily
were set against the backdrop of market competition.”48 The Renfro court
was similarly skeptical of plaintiffs’ claim that fees were excessive with
respect to “funds that are available on the same terms to individual
investors in the open market.” 49 In Loomis, it did not matter that an
employer chose excessive fee options for the plan; “[a]ny participant who
want[ed] a fund with expenses under 0.1% [could] get it through Exelon's
Plan.”50 The courts’ marketplace theory of liability essentially finds that an
employer can shed its fiduciary role in selecting 401(k) investment options
by choosing a menu that replicates the marketplace.
The market-based criteria on which these courts based the large
menu defense contradict not only the plain meaning of the control safe
harbor, as discussed supra in Section II, but also the essential nature of the
fiduciary duty. Judge Cardozo’s iconic characterization of the fiduciary
duty in Meinhard v. Salmon tees up the fundamental conflict between
fiduciary duties and market-based principles:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world
for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those
bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something
stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is
then the standard of behavior.51
In the fiduciary context, pure market dynamics cannot be relied upon to
yield the sought-after social benefits of commercial activities. Fiduciary
principles, therefore, are not circumscribed by the rules that apply to
commercial, “arm’s length” relationships, but are based on non-market
criteria because markets are not always efficient. Inefficiencies can reduce
the social utility of market-based transactions. These inefficiencies may
arise from a host of factors, including unequal bargaining positions,
informational asymmetries, monopoly power, bounded rationality and/or

48

See supra note 37.
Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 326 (3d Cir. 2011).
50
Loomis, 658 F.3d at 671.
51
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
49
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rent-seeking regulation. 52 Judge Cardozo may not have been thinking in
terms of economic theory yet to take concrete form, but he nevertheless
understood that, in the face of market inefficiencies, “honesty alone,” i.e.,
requiring only that a fiduciary refrain from fraud or other
misrepresentation, was inadequate to ensure that free market activities
would increase, rather than reduce, net social wealth.
Common law and statutory fiduciary duties reflect, respectively,
courts’ and legislators’ decisions to modify or supplant market forces with
external rules in situations in which market-based principles are likely to
fail to create the social benefits of commercial activities. While there is a
robust scholarship about when and to what extent fiduciary duties are
actually wealth-maximizing,53 there is general agreement with the position
that fiduciary duties are intended to and do, in fact, modify or supplant
market forces. They reflect an inherently paternalistic view that, when
fiduciary duties apply, courts and legislatures should redirect the natural
course of commerce even if doing so replaces the usually wealthmaximizing decisions of rational economic actors with the judgment of
government actors.
In short, courts applying the large menu defense simply disagree
with Congress’s decision to impose fiduciary duties on employers when
selecting 401(k) investment options. The Loomis court revealed the
ideological nature of its disagreement with Congress in charging that the
problem in that case was that the “[p]laintiffs' theory is paternalistic.”54
This statement, taken literally, is absurd because the legal theories
underlying a fiduciary claim are necessarily paternalistic. ERISA is
paternalistic to its core. The Congressional findings and declaration of
policy in ERISA speak of protecting the interests of plan beneficiaries “by
establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for
52

See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78 cmt. b (2007).
See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1996) (discussing the scope of managers’ duties
in the context of the corporation and the corporate contract). See also Paul
Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might be Right (Univ.
of Virginia Law School Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 00-8, Jan. 2000)
(finding higher rates of real per capita growth in common law economies); Ross
Levine et al., Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes (World
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 205, Feb. 1999) (finding that common
law systems enhance financial intermediary development, which causes higher
economic growth), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=247793.
54
658 F.3d at 673.
53
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fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate
remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.”55 Congress
sought to protect the interests of participants “by improving the equitable
character and the soundness of such plans.” 56 These broad, paternalistic
goals look to decidedly non-market-based rules to regulate the operation of
pension benefit plans.
The ERISA prudent man and prohibited transaction rules give
concrete form to the paternalistic structure and purpose of ERISA.
Employee pension plans are required to have a fiduciary and a fiduciary is
required to assume fiduciary duties with respect to the structure and
operation of the plan, including selecting investment options in the plan.
ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules narrowly circumscribe or flatly
prohibit transactions that normally would be subject only to the rules that
apply to arm’s-length deals. ERISA empowers employers to automatically
enroll employees in a plan and invest an employer-determined percentage
of the employee’s wages in an employer-selected investment option when
employees have not affirmatively taken these steps themselves.57
Regardless of whether ERISA’s paternalism is good policy, its
paternalism is undeniable. It is difficult to understand how the Loomis
court could criticize the “[p]laintiffs’ theory” for being “paternalistic” when
the private cause of action on which the theory is based is intrinsically
paternalistic. This contradiction is sharpened by the fact that the Loomis
opinion’s author, Judge Frank Easterbrook, established his reputation as a
scholar by elucidating the paternalistic nature of fiduciary duties and
identifying situations in which he believed that fiduciary duties should be
waivable or eliminated.
As a member of the judiciary, Judge Easterbrook has previously
attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to substitute a market-based test for an
express fiduciary duty under federal law. In Jones v. Harris Associates

55

29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006).
29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (2006).
57
ERISA’s automatic enrollment provision is the regulatory policy most
extensively discussed in Richard Thaler’s and Cass Sunstein’s best-seller, NUDGE:
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS, which is based
on a regulatory model that they call “libertarian paternalism.” RICHARD THALER &
CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND
HAPPINESS (2008).
56
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L.P.,58 he authored the opinion that affirmed the dismissal of a claim under
section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, which provides that
“the investment adviser of a registered investment company shall be
deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation
for services.” 59 Prior to Jones, courts had generally interpreted section
36(b) under a fiduciary standard established by the Second Circuit twentyfive years earlier in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.60
The Seventh Circuit rejected the Gartenberg standard in holding that the
fiduciary duty under section 36(b) could only be violated if the fees paid
were “‘so unusual’ as to give rise to an inference ‘that deceit must have
occurred, or that the persons responsible for decision have abdicated.’”61
As in Loomis, the court’s decision was based on its view that market forces,
not fiduciary duties, should be the exclusive determinant of prices, and that
“honesty alone” was enough.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Seventh Circuit’s
Jones decision. 62 The Court’s analysis is instructive as to the
incompatibility of strictly market-based rules of construction and the
intrinsically paternalistic nature of the fiduciary duty. It pointedly
summarized the Seventh Circuit’s Jones analysis as follows:
The panel argued that this [deceit-based] understanding of
§ 36(b) is consistent with the forces operating in the
contemporary mutual fund market. Noting that “[t]oday
thousands of mutual funds compete,” the panel concluded
that “sophisticated investors” shop for the funds that
produce the best overall results, “mov[e] their money
elsewhere” when fees are “excessive in relation to the
results,” and thus “create a competitive pressure” that

58

Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated 559 U.S.
335, 353 (2010). In the interests of full disclosure, this author was an expert
witness in Jones.
59
15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
60
Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
61
537 F.3d at 732.
62
As the Wall Street Journal editorial page has noted, “It isn’t easy to lose 9 0 on the current ideologically divided Supreme Court.” Editorial, Supremes 9, SEC
0, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2013, available at http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424127887324662404578330260976961512.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_
AboveLEFTTop.

356

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 20.2

generally keeps fees low. The panel faulted Gartenberg on
the ground that it “relies too little on markets.”63
The Court flatly rejected the idea that markets set the boundaries of Section
36(b)’s fiduciary duty.64 Instead, it treated Section 36(b)’s “fiduciary duty”
as a fiduciary duty. The Court adopted the traditional fiduciary standard
that it applied in Pepper v. Litton in 1939—notably reaching back to the era
of Cardozo’s fiduciary duty in Meinhard—which involved a “dominant or
controlling shareholder’s claim for compensation against a bankrupt
corporation.”65 Under that classically paternalistic standard, the shareholder
had the burden not only “to prove the good faith of the transaction but also
to show its inherent fairness.” 66 The Court’s holding reflected its
understanding that a statutory fiduciary duty represents the legislature’s
decision not to defer blindly to the “morals of the marketplace” because
free market forces will not always yield an optimal outcome.
One basis for the Court’s decision was its recognition that free
markets are not, in fact, necessarily wealth-maximizing. It warned that, in
applying Section 36(b), “courts should not rely too heavily on comparisons
with fees charged to mutual funds by other advisers. These comparisons
are problematic because these fees, like those challenged, may not be the
product of negotiations conducted at arm's length.”67
In support of this statement, the Court cited the dissent from the
Seventh Circuit’s denial of a rehearing en banc,68 in which Judge Richard
Posner had argued that “the panel base[d] its rejection of Gartenberg
mainly on an economic analysis that is ripe for reexamination on the basis
of growing indications that executive compensation in large publicly traded
firms often is excessive because of the feeble incentives of boards of
63

Jones, 559 U.S. at 342 (quoting Jones, 527 F.3d at 632).
Jones, 335 U.S. at 353. E.g. id. (“By focusing almost entirely on the
element of disclosure, the Seventh Circuit panel erred. An investment adviser
‘must make full disclosure and play no tricks but is not subject to a cap on
compensation.’”) (quoting Jones, 527 F.3d at 632)).
65
Jones, 335 U.S. at 346 (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939)).
66
Id. at 346-47 (quoting Pepper, 308 U.S. at 306-07).
67
Id. at 350-51 (emphasis added).
68
Id. (citing Jones, 537 F.3d at 731); id. (“Competition between money
market funds for shareholder business does not support an inference that
competition must therefore also exist between [investment advisers] for fund
business. The former may be vigorous even though the latter is virtually nonexistent.”) (quoting Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 929).
64
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directors to police compensation.69 Judge Posner continued, “[c]ompetition
in product and capital markets can't be counted on to solve the problem
because the same structure of incentives operates on all large corporations
and similar entities, including mutual funds.” 70 The Jones case suggests
that, if the large menu defense reaches the Court, it will be struck down just
as decisively as the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Jones.
Possibly concerned about being reversed on appeal again, Judge
Easterbrook attempted to distinguish Jones from Loomis on the ground that
the defendant in a section 36(b) case has a conflict of interest. A fund
manager directly benefits from the receipt of fees that the section 36(b)
plaintiff alleges are excessive. In contrast, “there is no reason to think that
Exelon chose the funds to enrich itself at participants' expense.”71 However,
there is no support, and the Loomis court cited none, for the proposition
that fiduciary liability under ERISA attaches only with proof of the
fiduciary’s self-dealing motive. To the contrary, “the great principles of
trust fiduciary law, loyalty and prudence, do not depend upon the
transferor's motive, whether making a gift or doing a deal.”72 A trustee is
69

Jones, 537 F.3d at 730 (Posner, J., dissenting).
Id.
71
Loomis, 658 F.3d at 671 (“[E]xelon had (and has) every reason to use
competition in the market for fund management to drive down the expenses
charged to participants, . . . Competition thus assists both employers and
employees, as Hecker observed.”). It is hard to take this distinction seriously, as
Judge Easterbrook made the same argument in Jones that a fund manager has the
same market-based incentive to keep fees low:
70

Holding costs down is vital in competition, when investors are
seeking maximum return net of expenses—and as management
fees are a substantial component of administrative costs, mutual
funds have a powerful reason to keep them low unless higher
fees are associated with higher return on investment. A
difference of 0.1% per annum in total administrative expenses
adds up by compounding over time and is enough to induce
many investors to change mutual funds. That mutual funds are
“captives” of investment advisers does not curtail this
competition. An adviser can't make money from its captive fund
if high fees drive investors away.
Jones, 527 F.3d at 631-32.
72
John H. Langbein, Essay, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an
Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 186 (1997).

358

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 20.2

bound to the duties it has assumed regardless of whether it may personally
benefit from any alleged malfeasance, just as ERISA’s prudent man
standard applies regardless of whether violating it is accompanied by a
financial benefit to the fiduciary.
The Loomis court’s preference for free market principles in
derogation of express statutory fiduciary duties reveals the ideological
nature of its position that ERISA fiduciary claims must conform to an
overriding, rational-actor model of human behavior. Yet the Supreme Court
rejected precisely this approach in Jones, namely, the court’s substitution of
its own economic analysis for Congress’s decision to qualify the primacy of
the rational actor model by imposing a fiduciary duty in certain situations.
If and when the market-based, large menu defense reaches the Court, it is
likely to suffer the same fate as the market-based approach taken in Jones.
The large menu defense goes further than exalting free market
principles over plain statutory mandates; it re-interprets ERISA’s
diversification requirement as a paean to the liberation ideology of free
choice. Courts in favor of the large menu defense consider choicemaximization to be a central purpose of ERISA. Tibble’s “centerpiece” of
ERISA was “participant choice.”73 Renfro viewed ERISA’s diversification
standard as “being designed to offer participants meaningful choices,”74 as
echoed by Loomis’s view that its purpose was, “[f]ar from reflecting a
paternalistic approach, [to] encourage sponsors to allow more choice to
participants.”75 Loomis applauded Exelon because, as directed by the safe
harbor, it had “left choice to the people who have the most interest in the
outcome, and it cannot be faulted for doing this.”76
The courts’ view that the purpose of ERISA is to maximize
participant choice, which turns the statute on its head. Congress did not
enact ERISA to generate more investment choices for workers; it enacted
ERISA to enhance their retirement security. As noted herein, ERISA
reflects a strongly paternalistic view of pension plans.77 Congress did not
73

Tibble, 711 F.3d at 1083.
Renfro, 671 F.3d at 327.
75
Loomis, 658 F.3d at 673.
76
Id.
77
See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (b)-(c) (2012); Loomis, 658 F.3d at 673; RICHARD H.
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (showing that ERISA’s automatic enrollment
provision is the regulatory policy and is based on a regulatory model that the
authors call “libertarian paternalism”).
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enact ERISA to free workers of some imaginary yoke of oppression
imposed by employers that offer a limited menu of 401(k) investment
options. Rather, Congress intended that ERISA restrict employers’ and
workers’ discretion, respectively, in offering and choosing investments.
The large menu defense treats consumer choice as an end in itself;
under ERISA, it is only a means to an end. The statute does not require
choice for choice’s sake. The 404(a) safe harbor mandates at least three
diversified investment options as a means of maximizing plan participants’
wealth, not as a means of promoting individual freedom. The DOL
conditions the safe harbor on plans’ offering a “broad range of investment
alternatives” not in order to enhance rational actors’ ability to maximize
their personal utility, but to maximize the wealth of plan participants as a
group based on the government’s faith in a particular theory of investing
(modern portfolio theory).78
The incentives that ERISA offers to employers to offer multiple
investment options, as well as related DOL regulations and interpretation,
reflect patently paternalistic public policy decisions about what is best for
workers. These policies are decidedly not motivated by a liberation
ideology of individual freedom and choice. The safe harbors relieve
employers of liability for following government guidelines in selecting
investment options, not for seeking to maximize plan participant freedom.
The courts’ re-characterization of a government mandate based on modern
portfolio theory as a policy of liberation designed to maximize worker
freedom is nothing more than wishful thinking, statutory nullification, or
both.
IV.

JUDICIAL ECONOMICS AND THE EMPIRICAL
CONSEQUENCES OF LARGE 401(K) MENUS

As discussed immediately above, the large menu defense is based
on the courts’ belief that ERISA’s prudent man rule is rendered inoperative
78

29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(1)(ii) (2010). See Philip J. Ruce, The Trustee
and the Prudent Investor: The Emerging Acceptance of Alternative Investments as
the New Fiduciary Standard, 53 S. TEX. L. REV. 653, 666-68 (2012) (discussing
relationship between modern portfolio theory and the prudent investor rule); W.
Scott Simon, Illuminating the ‘Broad Range’ Requirement of ERISA Section
404(c) With the Language of Modern Portfolio Theory Found in the Uniform
Prudent Investor Act and the Restatement 3rd of Trusts (Prudent Investor Rule),
13 J. PENSION BENEFITS 87 (2005) .
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as to an employer’s selection of 401(k) investment options if the employer
offers a large enough number of investment options. By offering a large
menu of options, the employer in Loomis, for example, “left choice to the
people who have the most interest in the outcome, and it cannot be faulted
for doing this.” 79 In contrast, employers such as Wal-Mart, that
paternalistically limit the number of investment options, thereby increase
their ERISA liability risk. This judicial exercise of extralegal authority is
reason to be concerned, but if the courts’ faith in the wealth-maximizing
effect of choice in 401(k) plans is well-founded, then at least workers
would be wealthier as a result.
However, larger 401(k) menus actually reduce workers’ wealth.
Research demonstrates that the assumption made by free market ideologues
that increasing choice in 401(k) plans maximizes wealth is empirically
false. The courts supporting the large menu defense do not cite any
research to support their view of the economic benefits of large 401(k)
menus; they seem entirely indifferent as to whether their theories bear any
relation to reality. The effect of the large menu defense is to make workers
poorer, while also creating a perverse incentive for employers to reduce
their ERISA liability risk by adding more options to their 401(k) plans.
The large menu defense reflects the courts’ view of the model of
plan participants as rational utility maximizers. Traditional free market
theory assumes that economic actors are rational. Consumers make choices
to maximize their personal wealth, or “utility.” A larger set of choices
should enhance consumers’ abilities to maximize their utility because with
every additional choice, the chance that the set of options will include the
most utility-maximizing option for a particular consumer increases. 80
Larger 401(k) menus should therefore be wealth maximizing because they
increase the likelihood that the set of investment options will include
utility-maximizing options for every participant. The more flavors of ice
cream that are available, the greater the likelihood that the consumer’s
favorite flavor will be among them. Conversely, restricting the size of
401(k) menus should reduce participants’ wealth because a smaller menu is
less likely to include the particular investment that will maximize a
participant’s utility.
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Loomis, 658 F.3d at 673-74.
See generally Sheena S. Iyengar &Wei Jiang, The Psychological Costs of
Ever Increasing Choice: A Fallback to the Sure Bet 3 (Columbia Univ., Working
Paper, 2005) (discussing rational choice theory).
80
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In practice, however, offering more choices to consumers adversely
affects their ability to maximize their utility. For example, numerous
studies have shown that offering subjects a small set of purchase options
increases the likelihood that they will make a purchase. One prominent
study found that shoppers were more likely to buy jam when offered six
flavors to choose from instead of twenty-four. One reason for the adverse
effect of providing more choices may be that choice creates stress, which
was illustrated by a study in which subjects were made to choose from
among an array of Godiva chocolates. They reported feelings of regret and
less certainty when offered thirty chocolates than when offered only six.
Thus, reducing the number of available choices can create both material
and psychological benefits.
While investment options in 401(k) plans are a far cry from jams and
chocolates, the effects of offering more choice to plan participants is the
same – and vastly more costly. Studies have shown that large menus have
the effect of substantially reducing plan participation rates, thereby
resulting in huge financial losses to workers. There is also empirical
evidence that large menus result in investment options that are lower
quality and more expensive, lead to inferior asset allocation decisions, and
impair the effectiveness of disclosure due to information overload. The
aggregate effects of the consequences of large menus are an annual
deadweight wealth reduction of billions of dollars and a less secure
retirement for millions of Americans.
A. LARGE MENU EFFECTS – REDUCED PARTICIPATION RATES
The most prominent study on the effect of large 401(k) menus is
also the most comprehensive. Three Columbia University researchers
studied the participation rates of more than 800,000 employees across 647
plans. 81 In short, they found that, with every ten additional options, the
plan’s participation rate declined by approximately two percentage points.
As the number of investment options increased from two to eleven, the
participation rate declined steadily from 75% to 70%. The participation
rate remained at approximately 70% as the number of options increased
from eleven to thirty, at which point the rate began to decline
approximately two percentage points for each ten-option increase. The
81

Id at 2. See also GARY R. MOTTOLA & STEPHEN P. UTKUS, VANGUARD CTR.
FOR RET. RES., CAN THERE BE TOO MUCH CHOICE IN A RETIREMENT SAVINGS
PLAN? (2003) (summarizing and commenting on Iyengar & Jiang, supra note 80).
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participation rate declined to 67% when the number of investment options
increased to thirty-five, and declined further to 61% when the number of
options reached fifty-six.82
These data take on a human face when applied to an actual 401(k)
plan. As discussed herein, Deere’s plan included twenty-five core mutual
fund options and 2,500 additional funds. The plan had approximately
31,000 participants, 83 which would represent a participation rate ranging
from 61% to 68%, depending on whether one treated the plan as offering
more than fifty-six options (61%) or only twenty-five options (68%).84 If
the plan had offered only two options and achieved a 75% participation
rate, it would have had approximately 38,000 participants under the fiftysix-plus-options assumption and 34,000 participants under a twenty-fiveoption assumption. In other words, by providing its employees with a large
number of investment options, Deere effectively excluded 3,000 to 8,000
employees from its plan,85 and reduced its ERISA liability risk by doing so.
The wealth reduction caused by large menus is staggering, primarily
because nonparticipation deprives employees of the company match.
About 85% of plan sponsors make matching contributions to defined
contribution plans. 86 The most common match amount is either 50% or
82

A 2009 survey by Watson Wyatt found that the most common number of
options in 401(k) plans was ten to fourteen, with 11% of plans offering more than
twenty-four options. SeeNews Archives – August / September 2009, BENEFITS AND
PENSIONS MONITOR ONLINE,http://www.bpmmagazine.com/benefits_news_august
_september_2009.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2014).
83
Second Am. Compl. for Breach of Fiduciary Duty at para. 28(a), Hecker v.
Deere & Co., No. 06-C-0719-S (W.D. Wis., Mar. 6, 2007) 2007 WL 2891544, at
*8.
84
If 30,000 participants equaled a 61% or a 68% participation rate, then a 75%
participation rate would equal, respectively, 36,885 and 33,088 participants
(.75*(30000/.61) and .75*(30,000/.68)). The participation rate estimates in this
section are extrapolated from the Columbia analysis for illustrative purposes. They
are not intended to reflect actual rates, which are generally available in a
company’s Form 5500 filings.
85
Exelon’s large menu probably had a similar effect. Approximately 23,000
Exelon Corp. employees participated in its thirty-two-option retirement plan,
which, assuming a large-menu-suppressed 68% participation rate, means that 2,000
fewer employees participated than likely would have participated in a two-option
plan. See Compl. for Breach of Fiduciary Duty at para. 27(a), Loomis v. Exelon
Corp., No. 06CV4900 (N.D. Ill.., Sept. 11, 2006), 2006 WL 2791653 (23,000
participants in Exelon plan).
86
See AON HEWITT, 2011 TRENDS AND EXPERIENCE IN DEFINED
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100% of employee contributions up to 6% of their pay.87 Deere offered a
maximum 401(k) match of 6%, 88 which means that for every $1
contributed by an employee up to 6% of their pay, Deere contributed $1 to
the employee’s 401(k) account. For a Deere employee earning $25,000
annually who contributed 6% of his pay to Deere’s 401(k) plan, the 6%
match would represent $1,500 in additional annual income. The Deere
employee who does not participate in the 401(k) plan receives none of this
additional income. Assuming Deere’s large menu effectively excludes
3,000 to 8,000 employees from its plan, these employees lose $4.5 to $12
million in income every year, even before taking into account lost
investment gains.
By offering a large menu, Deere reduces not only its ERISA liability
risk, but also its compensation expenses. The $4.5 to $12 million of
foregone annual income directly increases Deere’s profits. This means that
the Seventh Circuit’s assumption that employers do not have a conflict of
interest in the design of their 401(k) plans is actually false.89 Employers can
increase their profits by increasing the size of their 401(k) menus because
CONTRIBUTION PLANS 4 (2011), available at http://www.aon.com/attachments/
thought-leadership/2011_Trends_Experience_Executive_Summary_v5.pdf.
87
See id.
88
See Hecker v. Deere & Co. 556 F.3d 575, 579 (7th Cir. 2009).
89
Loomis, 658 F.3d at 671 (Exelon “had (and has) every reason to use
competition in the market for fund management to drive down the expenses
charged to participants, . . . Competition thus assists both employers and
employees, as Hecker observed.”). It is hard to take this distinction seriously, as
Judge Easterbrook made the same argument in Jones that a fund manager has the
same market-based incentive to keep fees low:
Holding costs down is vital in competition, when investors are
seeking maximum return net of expenses—and as management
fees are a substantial component of administrative costs, mutual
funds have a powerful reason to keep them low unless higher
fees are associated with higher return on investment. A
difference of 0.1% per annum in total administrative expenses
adds up by compounding over time and is enough to induce
many investors to change mutual funds. That mutual funds are
“captives” of investment advisers does not curtail this
competition. An adviser can't make money from its captive fund
if high fees drive investors away.
Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 631-32 (7th Cir. 2008).
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that will result in fewer employees taking advantage of the employer
match. The employer will still be able to attract workers by advertising
employee compensation as including a 6% match. This cause-and-effect
relationship is, of course, somewhat attenuated, but it is useful in
illustrating the absurd position in which the large menu defense courts have
placed employers.
In contrast with Deere’s being rewarded for its large menu, WalMart was punished for offering a limited menu that, precisely because it is
limited, creates billions of dollars of wealth for its employees.90 The WalMart plan offered eleven investment options and had approximately one
million participants, which would represent a 70% participation rate under
the Columbia analysis. If Wal-Mart had offered fifty-six options, its plan’s
predicted participation rate would have been 61%, which translates into
approximately 130,000 fewer employees participating in the plan. WalMart offers a full match up to 6% of the employee’s pay, which for
130,000 employees earning $25,000 annually would total approximately $2
billion over ten years, even before taking into account investment gains.
Thus, Wal-Mart employees’ wealth has been increased by billions of
dollars because Wal-Mart’s plan has a limited menu of options. The large
menu defense creates an incentive, however, for Wal-Mart to increase the
number of options in its plan in order to reduce its ERISA liability
exposure. If Wal-Mart decides to follow the guidance of the courts which
support the large menu defense, then its workers will be billions of dollars
poorer as a result.
The adverse effects of large menus are most pronounced for the
groups who stand the most to lose by not participating in 401(k). The
Columbia researchers found that the reduction in participation rates caused
by large menus was even greater for older workers, female workers and
low-income workers.91 These are the groups for whom inadequate investing
for retirement will have the direst consequences. Older workers have less
time to put away funds for retirement, females live longer and therefore
have longer retirements to plan for, and low-income workers have the
greatest need for each additional dollar of income in retirement. The
90

Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 603 n.6 (8th Cir. 2009); see
Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 796 F. Supp. 2d 959, 963 (S.D. Iowa 2010)
(citing argument that limited menu in Braden, compared with large menu in
Hecker, made imprudent management claim more plausible); Tibble v. Edison
Int’l, 711 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2013).
91
Iyengar & Jiang, supra note 80, at 16.
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disproportionate effect of large menus on these groups will impose greater
financial burdens on society as well because reduced standards of living in
retirement will inevitably place greater pressure on our already strained
Social Security system.
B.

LARGE MENU
ALLOCATIONS

EFFECTS

–

OVERLY

CONSERVATIVE

The losses attributable to large menus are by no means limited to
lower participation rates. The Columbia study found that large menus also
harm participants by causing them to make overly conservative allocations
of their assets. This finding is consistent with general research showing
that increasing choice suppresses risk-taking. For example, in one study,
researchers asked subjects to choose from a series of hypothetical salary
options. The researchers found that the subjects’ willingness to take risks
was inversely correlated with the number of options offered. Similar
studies have shown that subjects are more likely to make worse decisions
as the number of options increases. For example, a 1995 study found that
doctors, when offered the option of prescribing either of two medicines for
a medical condition, each of which would have been an improvement over
doing nothing, usually chose to do nothing.92
These responses to increasing the number of choices were similarly
reflected in plan participants’ allocation decisions. The Columbia
researchers found that, for every ten-option increase in the size of the
menu, participants’ allocations to equity funds decreased by 7.1 to 8.9
percentage points, “an amount both economically and statistically
significant (at the 2.5% level).”93 This reduction in equity fund allocations
is not nearly as striking as the increase in participants who allocated none
of their contributions to equities. The researchers found that “the

92

See Donald A. Redelmeier & Eldar Shafir, Medical Decision Making in
Situations That Offer Multiple Alternatives, 273 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 302 (1995),
available at
https://psych.princeton.edu/~psych/psychology/research/shafir/
pubs/JAMA.pdf.
93
See Iyengar & Jiang, supra note 80, at 30; see also Sheena S. Iyengar &
Emir Kamenica, Choice Proliferation, Simplicity Seeking, and Asset Allocation, 94
J. PUB. ECON. 530 (2010) (finding that when a correlation is statistically significant
at the 2.5% level, there is a 2.5% chance that a correlation is the result of chance).

366

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 20.2

probability that an individual contributes anything at all to equity funds
also drops by 3.1-4.6%, significantly different from zero at the 5% level.”94
Conversely, a ten-option menu increase resulted in “3.9% and 5.4%
increases in contribution allocations to, respectively, money market funds
alone and both money market and bond funds combined.” 95 Each tenoption menu increase also produced “nearly a 2% increase in the
percentage of choosers who allocated over half their contributions to
money market funds alone, and a 3.6% increase in the percentage of
choosers who allocated over half their contributions to money markets and
bonds combined.”96 This shift of assets to less volatile classes would make
sense for older workers, but the researchers found that the effects of large
menus were uncorrelated with age or job tenure. These effects were
greater, however, for female workers and low-income workers,97 for whom
the adverse effects of inadequate retirement preparedness are also greater.98
These large-menu effects impose substantial opportunity costs on
plan participants. The expected value of a twenty-year investment in
equities, which is an appropriate investment period in light of the increased
risk of equity investments, is substantially higher than the expected value
of a twenty-year investment in bonds or money market instruments. This
problem of overly conservative investment options was a concern for the
94

See Iyengar & Jiang, supra note 80, at 30. This tendency may be countered
if the percentage of equity funds grows with the size of the menu because investors
tend to increase their allocations to a particular asset class in proportion to that
asset class’s representation in the menu. See Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler,
Naive Diversification Strategies in Defined Contribution Saving Plans, 91 AM.
ECON. REV. 79, 87 (2001) (finding that when equity options comprised a larger
percentage of hypothetical options, study subjects invested a larger percentage of
accounts in equities than when equity options comprised a smaller percentage of
options), available at http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/documents/areas/fac/
accounting/naive_diversification.pdf; see also Jeffrey Brown et al., Individual
Account Investment Options and Portfolio Choice: Behavioral Lessons from
401(K) Plans (NBER Working Paper, No. 13169, June 2007) (increasing equity
fund representation from 1/3 to 1/2 of menu increased participants’ equity
allocations by 7.5%) (“Behavioral Lessons”), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w13169.pdf?new_window=1; Karlsson et al., supra note 46 (likelihood of
option being chosen increases with its representation in menu), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=888661.
95
See Iyengar & Jiang, supra note 80, at 33-34. .
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Id.
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Id. at 31.
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Id. at 16.
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DOL in 2006, when it was considering the kinds of investment options to
which employers should allocate contributions of participants who
provided no instructions. Stable value fund sponsors lobbied the DOL to
include such funds as “qualified default investment alternatives,” but DOL
wisely rejected their entreaties. Its decision to encourage more appropriate
risk-taking by participants contrasts with the large menu defense’s effect of
arbitrarily reducing risk-taking by encouraging larger menus. The large
menu defense similarly undermines the 2006 legislative reform that
permitted automatic enrollment of employees in 401(k) plans and has
substantially increased plan participation rates. On both fronts, the large
menu defense courts are effectively undoing the demonstrated benefits of
regulatory reforms.
C.

LARGE MENU EFFECTS – INFERIOR INVESTMENT OPTIONS

In addition to reducing participation rates and causing overly
conservative asset allocations, large menus reduce the quality of the
investment options in 401(k) plans as a group. Researchers have found that
the quality of the funds in a plan declines as the number of options
increases. 99 David Goldreich and Hanna Hałaburda studied 131 401(k)
plans with the number of investment options offered ranging from four to
twenty-eight. They evaluated the objective quality of the plans by
comparing their respective Sharpe ratios, which measure expected
investment return in light of the degree of risk taken by the investor. The
data showed a negative correlation between the number of investment
options offered and the quality of the plan that was significant at the 1%
level. Like the Columbia group, Goldreich and Hałaburda concluded
“empirically that larger menus are objectively worse than smaller menus,
on average, in an important economic context—401(k) pension plans,
where a plan is a menu of investment choices.”
Along the same lines, Nina Tang and Olivia Mitchell found that
increasing the number of investment options offered in a 401(k) plan did
not increase the efficiency of the menu. They evaluated efficiency based
on each plan’s Sharpe ratio, degree of nondiversifiable risk, and
participants’ potential welfare/utility loss resulting from a less efficient
menu.100 They concluded that, “even with a handful of investment choices,
99

See Goldreich & Hałaburda, supra note 3, at 1.
Ning Tang & Olivia S. Mitchell, The Efficiency of Pension Plan Investment
Menus: Investment Choices in Defined Contribution Pension Plans (Mich. Ret.
100
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participants will not suffer from menu restriction, as long as the choices
offered are sensible ones.”101 They found that it would be “more sensible to
add funds that make the menu more efficient, than simply to make the
menu longer,” 102 which is precisely the intent of the three-option and
broad-range diversification safe harbor requirements. 103 “The key factor
contributing to plan efficiency and performance has to do with the types of
funds offered, rather than the total number of investment options
provided.”104
Larger menus are also correlated with higher cost options. 105
Researchers have found that, as the size of a 401(k) plan’s menu increases,
the representation of actively-managed funds increases at a greater rate.
Actively managed funds charge higher fees than index funds, which means
that larger menus correlate with higher costs. The higher fees also mean
that large menus have inferior performance. The researchers found that,
while the gross performance of index and actively-managed funds was
similar, their relative performance net of fees was quite different, with
index funds substantially outperforming in terms of both investment returns
and percentile ranking.106 Thus, large menus are correlated with inferior,
higher-cost, lower-performing investment options and provide no
efficiency benefits.
D.

LARGE MENU EFFECTS AND INFORMATION OVERLOAD

The foregoing empirical research demonstrates that rational choice
theory fails in the context of large 401(k) menus, notwithstanding the faith
that courts in favor of the large menu defense have in the infallible
Res. Ctr., Working Paper 2008-176, No. UM08-20), available at
http://www.mrrc. isr.umich.edu/publications/papers/pdf/wp176.pdf.
101

Id. at 7.
Id. at 16.
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See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3)(i)(B)(1-4).
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Tang & Mitchell., supra note 100, at 2.
105
See Brown et al., supra note 47, at 2.
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See id. at 26 (“while the actively managed and index equity funds offered
in our sample of 401(k) plans have similar performance before accounting for
expenses (index funds actually slightly outperformed, but the difference is not
significant), they differ significantly in their reported annual expenses (on the order
of 50 basis points per year), which leads to worse performance after accounting for
expenses (both in terms of returns and percentile rankings within its investment
objective.)”).
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efficiency of “rational” actors and free markets. Large menus cause
employees to make worse choices either by making inferior asset allocation
decisions or by not participating in 401(k) plans at all. Large menus also
result in inferior options being selected by employers. One explanation for
investors’ behavioral response to large menus is information overload and
complexity, which is particularly ironic in the context of the free market
ideology underlying the large menu defense. That ideology assumes that
investors are better off with large menus because it is more likely that the
menu will include, for example, a low-cost fund. As the Loomis court
argued, “[a]ny participant who want[ed] a fund with expenses under 0.1%
can get it through Exelon's Plan.”107 However, the fact that a large menu
may be more likely to include such a low-cost fund misses the point. The
evidence suggests that an investor would be less likely to actually find or
invest in the 0.1% fund precisely because it was part of a large menu.
Researchers have found that search costs are a significant factor in
the depressing effect of large choice sets on consumers’ willingness to
make choices. 108 The additional search costs that a large menu of
investment options imposes may lead investors not to search at all (i.e., not
participate), or to favor the simplest options, such as money market and
bond funds.109 They may be more likely to follow irrational heuristics, such
as making an allocation to equity investments based on the percentage of
equity options offered.110 Large menus that impose high search costs make
it less likely that investors are actually exercising the “control” that is the
basis of the control safe harbor because they will be deterred from
exercising control by search costs, yet courts employing the large menu
defense assume that larger menus lead to the exercise of greater participant
control. In fact, investors may be more likely to avoid an excessive fee
fund that is included in a small menu rather than a large one because they
are more likely to seek out information about a small number of funds than
107

Loomis, 658 F.3d at 671.
See generally Dmitri Kuksov & J. Miquel Villas-Boas, When More
Alternatives Lead to Less Choice, 29 MKTG. SCI. 507 (2010), available at
http://groups.haas.berkeley.edu/marketing/PAPERS/VILLAS/Marketing%20Scien
ce%202010%20alternatives.pdf; Julie Agnew & Lisa Szykman, Asset Allocation
and Information Overload: The Influence of Information Display, Asset Choice,
and Investor Experience, 6 J. BEHAV. FIN. 57 (2005) (showing that study subjects
reported greater feeling of information overload with more choices) available at
http://mason.wm.edu/faculty/agnew_j/documents/assetallocation.pdf.
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when intimidated by a large number. As one research team concluded, “the
burgeoning number of actively-managed funds [in large 401(k) menus]
makes it harder for investors to find the lower-cost index fund in the
plan.”111 In other words, investors are less likely to conduct the information
search necessary to identify the low-cost needle when included in a large
menu haystack.
V.

CONCLUSION

The law and economics movement was the most influential
jurisprudential development of the 20th century. The application of
economic principles to traditional legal concepts has substantially
improved our understanding of the relationship between law and practice.
In no field has this been truer than in the regulation of commercial
activities. Law and economics has improved our ability to apply traditional
notions of equity, such as good faith and fair dealing, unconscionability,
and fiduciary duties, in ways that better achieve their utility-maximizing
purpose.
However, law and economics, especially in the hands of judges, can
be an instrument of economic destruction when based on blind adherence
to a free market ideology unmoored from any empirical foundation. The
large menu defense adopted by some courts applies an axiom of free
market adherents—rational choice theory—the social utility of which is
disproved by empirical research on the actual effect of large 401(k) menus
on workers’ welfare. Large 401(k) menus already cost American workers
billions of dollars every year. The effect of the large menu defense, unless
promptly repealed by Congress or overturned by the Supreme Court, will
exacerbate the problem of large 401(k) menus and cause billions of dollars
of additional losses.
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